Impacting on Internal Oversight - a challenge facing policing oversight in South Africa

Changing Oversight Environment

Support for police oversight and accountability in South Africa no longer enjoys the political and public prominence it had in the years immediately following the country's first democratic election in 1994.¹ There have been a number of disconcerting developments that lead one to draw such conclusions. The first and most significant casualty was the downscaling of the National Secretariat for Safety and Security.² Recently there have been worrying signs for the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD). In his 2005 budget vote³, the Minister for Safety and Security Charles Nqakula, stated his intention to "consolidate" the role of the ICD and the Secretariat for Safety and Security. A few months later, the South African parliament's, National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security, highlighted a number of structural issues that required consideration, to address what they have billed as a failure by the ICD⁴ . The contract of the ICD's executive director was not renewed and a year later a new director is yet to be appointed. This trend is concerning, not only because of its evident impact on the quality of civilian oversight but because it marks an ever narrowing space for lobbying and advocacy around one of the most pressing challenges of police reform in South Africa - the need to strengthen and improve the internal systems of discipline and control.

Internal Policing Oversight

Effective policing oversight operates on three levels, State and Government control, Social or Civilian Control and internal control.⁵ While the first two were covered reasonably well in the transformation of the old authoritarian South African Police into the new South African Police Services (SAPS), the latter has not received adequate attention.⁶ In turn it undermines much of the other levels of policing oversight. While the ICD currently plays an important role in holding police officers to account it can, (bar referring a matter for criminal prosecution) only recommend action be taken by the SAPS themselves. The SAPS in turn are under no obligation to respond to the ICD on the extent to which they have complied with recommendations and why.⁷ There is thus very little by way of holding SAPS to account when it comes to the outcome of investigations into improper conduct that do not warrant or have the strength of evidence for criminal prosecution.

There are several reasons why internal oversight mechanisms have not been subjected to the attention they need. Initially the focus of transformation project was to establish civilian control over the police and build public confidence in the new institution. This has been largely achieved and South Africa can boast of elaborate policing oversight architecture.⁸ Internal systems of control in contrast received inadequate attention and have not seen as fundamental transformation as the changing rank structures and racial representivity. They were in contrast generally weakened in the transformation process. The military style command and control approach to discipline was transformed to an approach based on labour law. Not only were the SAPS unprepared for this change but the continued predominance of white personnel in the upper echelons of the SAPS, meant that the enforcement of discipline over a predominantly black rank and file was politically highly charged.

In addition, facilities that were initially created to deal with corruption were also closed down early on. The Anti Corruption Unit which received 6480 cases of alleged police corruption and arrested over 1000 police officers in 2000 was completely closed down in 2002. Newham (2005) argues that part of the reason for this was that the unit was causing embarrassment by drawing attention to the extent of corruption in the SAPS.⁹

Without a dedicated unit to tackle police corruption, information about the extent of the problem and the SAPS response to it largely dried up. In 2004 they reported only 374 cases of members suspended because of corrupt activities. This suggests that the closure of the Anti-Corruption Unit SAPS has undermined the institutional capacity of the SAPS to take action against corrupt police officers. Nevertheless, the 2003 ISS victim survey revealed that of the 45% of respondents dissatisfied with the police, 35% cited corruption as the reason for their dissatisfaction.¹⁰

Nonetheless the SAPS maintain that their members are increasingly subject to discipline. However the chances of receiving no sanction are as high as 50% and of this the greatest proportion of cases are withdrawn. Further research among police themselves showed that only a minority thought they would face dismissal if caught accepting a bribe.¹¹

The single most important area for improving the SAPS is by improving internal accountability systems. In particular, the SAPS should be regularly reviewing the effectiveness of performance appraisal and discipline management systems and procedures. Clear action plans for improvement should be developed and the relevant resources allocated. It is only in this way that the unacceptably high levels of incompetence and corruption will be overcome in the SAPS.

The role of civil society in addressing issues of Internal Oversight

Internal Oversight is a central tenet in the developing notion of democratic policing.¹² It is evident that concerted efforts are required to make this process more transparent, understand it better and strengthen it.

The current advocacy environment for policing oversight poses significant challenges to strengthening internal oversight. The national police commissioner is in charge of SAPS and accountable to the minister; beyond that there is very little space to influence policy within the police.¹³ This is further restrained by the political climate. Following the 1999 outcries at crime levels, the initial openness to outside input and civilian oversight quickly closed. Currently South Africa faces another alarming crime spike¹⁴ and in response there have been renewed calls for a tough approach on crime. If the past is anything to go by, the emphasis on fighting crime has tended to close down space for building and strengthening policing oversight.

Steven Friedman formerly of the Centre for Policy Studies speaking at a workshop on police oversight and accountability hosted by the OSF-SA distinguishes between the notions of an accessible and an obstructive oversight environment.¹⁵ In the first, there is broad in principal agreement on the issues and discussion on what to do and how to do it. Civil Society can engage the state on a healthy basis to pin the best way forward. In an obstructive environment, which the current policing oversight environment largely is, there is no consensus on an issue. Gains are made over a period of time capitalising on external factors rather than technical expertise and logic.

In May 2006 South African National Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi reopened the debate on internal policing oversight when he told the National Council of Provinces' (the second house in the country's parliamentary structure) Select Committee on Safety that in his opinion, the Independent Complaints Directorate was no longer necessary. He went on to say the South African Police Services (SAPS) had its own 'evaluation services division that dealt with the need for corrective measures to be taken as a result of improper police action'.¹⁶ Disturbingly, the National Secretary who oversaw the demise of the National Secretariat after 1999 was subsequently appointed as the Head of the SAPS Evaluation Service Division. Duxita Mistry formerly of the ISS notes that since 2001 National Evaluation Services have received far fewer public complaints against police officers than the number reported to the ICD.¹⁷

David Bruce at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation expresses concern at what seems to be a general lack of understanding of the purpose of oversight bodies such as the ICD and their role in preventing and controlling police criminality. In his opinion bodies such as the Independent Complaints Directorate are usually established as a response to the problem of the lack of effectiveness of internal investigative bodies.¹⁸

At a workshop on the policing oversight organized by the Institute for Security Studies on the 27 June 2006, Chief director of investigations at the ICD, Tommy Tshabalala joined growing numbers of NGO commentators by listing the failure by police to implement the directorate’s recommendations as a shortcoming.

Internal oversight in the SAPS is an important issue for police reform generally and South Africa’s efforts at crime control particularly. Without addressing issues of police conduct and performance it is unlikely that the SAPS will be able to win over the trust and support of the community it needs if it is to combat crime effectively. The resolve of civil society will be tested in its ability to build on the initial success of policing reform in South Africa and achieve progress in this area.

Sean Tait is a member of the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF)

1.   Bruce, D n Neild R The Police we want a handbook for oversight of police in South Africa, CSVR, 2005.
2.  Pelser, E., J. Rauch and M. Shaw, "Police Reform in South Africa", A synthesis of papers delivered at the African Security Dialogue and Research Roundtable on Police and Policing, Accra, Ghana (2002), 8.
3.  Safety and Security Budget Vote, South African National Assembly, 12 April 2005.
4. National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security,17 August 2005.
5.   Stone C and Ward R Democratic Policing, A framework for Action, Policing and Society 10, 2000.
6.  Newham, G, Democratic Policing in South Africa through internal systems of officer control in South African Review of Sociology, 2005, Vol 36 No 2.
7.  Mistry D and Lue Dugmore M, An Overview of the Independent Complaints Directorate in the light of proposals to restructure the Directorate, April 2005, OSF-SA, Cape, Cape Town.
8.  Frank, C and Tait, S Police Transformation and Accountability in South Africa, in Justice Initiatives, Open Society Justice Initiative, February 2005.
9.  Newham, G, Strengthening Democratic Policing in South Africa through internal systems of officer control in South African Review of Sociology, 2005, Vol 36 No 2.
10.  Burton P et al, National victims of crime survey South Africa 2003 Monograph 101, Pretoria ISS, 2004.
11.  Newham, G, Strengthening Democratic Policing in South Africa through internal systems of officer control in South African Review of Sociology, 2005, Vol 36 No 2.
12.  Bruce, D n Neild R The Police we want a handbook for oversight of police in South Africa, CSVR, 2005.
13.  Newham, G, Strengthening Democratic Policing in South Africa through internal systems of officer control in South African Review of Sociology, 2005, Vol 36 No 2.
14.  Mail and Guardian, 14 July 2006.
15.  Friedman, S, The argument for citizen based oversight – OSF-SA workshop on Policing oversight, Johannesburg, 25 - 26 July 2005.
16.  Business day 22 May 2006.
17.  Sunday Independent 28 May 2006.
18.  ibd