Introspection

Policing Terrorism: Is Accountability Lost in the Fray?
Taken from the CHRI's 2007 report Stamping Out Rights: The impact of anti-terrorism laws on policing.

Accountability need not be held hostage to counter terrorism. The readiness to pass anti-terrorism legislation has not been coupled with the same zeal to ensure that broader police powers are accompanied with stricter accountability. Accounting for actions taken under cover of legal sanction, as well as for brazen misconduct, is no more rigorous: judicial review, internal disciplinary and monitoring procedures, and external oversight have not been correspondingly strengthened. There are a few notable examples where well-developed accountability mechanisms do what they can within their powers to maintain vigilant oversight of counter-terrorism policing activities. But the reality in too many Commonwealth jurisdictions is that accountability over the police remains endemically weak.

Accountability: Non-Negotiable in Any Circumstance

Strict accountability over expanded powers should be non-negotiable because public trust in police propriety is a potent tool in the fight against terrorism. Stringent accountability is needed to instil public faith in the state's institutions and systems. Where populations are directly affected by conflict between police and terrorists, there is a particularly strong clamour for accountability. Sensing this popular mood, political parties contesting the 2002 elections in Jammu and Kashmir ran their campaigns on two promises: that all custodial killings and human rights violations by security forces would be investigated and that the state Human Rights Commission would be strengthened.¹ Ongoing cycles of violence flourish because of a loss of faith in the state's policies, intentions and ability to protect the public. As a result people are hesitant to come forward with information in aid of the state, particularly when they feel that harm is as likely to come from the state as from non-state actors. Greater accountability can stop this cycle. Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen mistakenly imprisoned in Syria for alleged links to Al-Qaeda, champions the need for accountability after his experience: "…accountability is not about seeking revenge; it is about making our institutions better and a model for the rest of the world. Accountability goes to the heart of our democracy. It is a fundamental pillar that distinguishes our society from police states." ²

Everyday policing needs careful monitoring to ensure that abuse is minimised and performance maximised. Importantly, people aggrieved by police conduct must have effective and accessible complaints forums. Though there are many and varied models, robust accountability requires vigilant internal procedures coupled with external oversight. Ideally, this involves the three arms of government plus at least one independent body.

Internal police accountability, with the formal disciplinary system at its centre, is the first line of defence against police misconduct. It is imperative that this system is transparent, pro-active and independent. In addition, police reform efforts in countries like South Africa and Northern Ireland point to the value of supplementing internal accountability systems with some form of external, non-police (preferably civilian) oversight. External accountability mechanisms, either as specialist police oversight agencies or autonomous government bodies such as human rights commissions, create avenues for public complaints to be pursued outside of the police. With one system complementing and reinforcing the other, and the constant oversight by the three arms of government, this approach creates a web of accountability in which it becomes increasingly difficult for police misconduct to take place without consequences.

Accountability needs to be extended in proportion to enhanced police powers. In order to achieve this, counter-terrorism policing requires accountability mechanisms to be vigilant over both specialised civilian policing units, and non-civilian security agencies such as military and intelligence services involved in anti-terrorism. This is particularly important in countries where there are newly created agencies or sub-units specially constituted to fight terrorism, often with no clear lines of accountability.

The Worst-Case Scenario: Absent Accountability, Flourishing Abuses

In counter-terrorism policing, grave human rights abuses by police and other security forces are a reality. Even where abuses are endemic and there is awareness within governments, deep-seated problems of violence and impunity persist. A first and necessary step to put a stop to these practices is a commitment to accountability. The state can quickly win back public goodwill by ending tolerance for human rights abuses by security forces. But often where this is most needed, the response is just not committed enough. Commenting on Sri Lanka, Human Rights Watch asserts, "perhaps more than anything else, impunity for human rights violations has helped to perpetuate the cycle of violence and reprisal that continues to plague the country".³ It does not help matters when abuses occur in remote, far-flung areas, further away from accountability's reach.

In two decades of civil war in Sri Lanka, more than 12,000 cases of "disappearances" have been reported to the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; and virtually all of them have occurred in the midst of the violent conflict between the government and the LTTE.⁴ In most of these cases, there has been no information on the fate of the victims. Very few have been properly investigated and prosecuted. Human Rights Watch argues that "successive Sri Lankan governments have failed to prosecute those in the security forces responsible for serious human rights violations and war crimes".⁵ In the meantime, important oversight bodies in Sri Lanka such as the Human Rights Commission and the National Police Commission have been deliberately and severely undermined since early 2006, with the President's unilateral appointment of commissioners outside of the required constitutional process.

The Ugandan Lords Resistance Army, proscribed as a terrorist group in Uganda, intensified President Museveni's insistence on adopting a military approach to end the ongoing war in the north of the country.⁶ This led to the formation of the Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force, a specialised unit that brings together military and police elements. The Uganda Human Rights Commission used army sources to confirm that undisclosed locations, referred to as "safe houses", exist and are used by units such as the task force to "contain suspected hard-core criminals involved in terrorism before they are taken to gazetted areas and later to the courts of law."⁷ Reportedly, safe houses emerged as a specific response of security forces to terrorist attacks. Extending checks and balances to these secret locations is challenging. For example, the Human Rights Commission was dependent on an army delegation for their investigation and was only able to establish the existence of these places, not who was detained there, for how long, and what happened to them.

Northern Ireland's Police Ombudsman has found evidence that Special Branch officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary protected members of the banned Ulster Volunteer Force and allowed them to commit up to 15 murders over a period of 12 years towards the end of the conflict over British rule of Northern Ireland.⁸ Similarly, the recent fake encounter killings in Ganderbal district of Jammu and Kashmir call attention to the severe dangers of instituting a system of cash rewards and speedy promotions based on how many "terrorist" deaths a police officer is able to tally up.

From Accountability to Impunity

The journey to impunity is well traversed in many Commonwealth countries. It begins when police officers operate without respect for policing standards and are able to get away with it. Most if not all Commonwealth police organisations have mandatory internal procedures where officers are required to account for bullets used, and internal investigations into fatal shootings, deaths in custody, or instances where excessive force is used. In the context of counter-terrorism policing, it is vitally important to ensure the internal system is able to properly monitor the lawfulness of all arrests. In the absence of such mechanism, suspects are vulnerable to police abuse, which can spiral into enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings. Yet, frequently, weak enforcement of these legal requirements in many countries has led in-built accountability procedures to fail.

Clauses providing police with de facto immunity from criminal proceedings are another attack on accountability. Immunity provisions often require state sanction, or evidence that the officer did not act in good faith before prosecution can take place. For instance, in Sri Lanka the sanction of the Attorney General is required for the prosecution of a police officer.⁹ In India, government sanction for prosecution of police is required, even on the basis of evidence collected by formal police investigation.¹⁰ Evidence from South Asia shows that when sought, state sanction is rarely forthcoming and thereby accountability is blocked. Similarly, Lesotho's Internal Security Act shields police officers for any actions committed in good faith under the Act.¹¹ Uganda's Anti-Terrorism Act allows for tremendously wide police powers of search and seizure, and also stipulates that investigation officers are not liable to any civil action in respect of anything done in good faith under the authority of an order issued under that section.¹² Immunity provisions often render police accountability meaningless, in particular where they operate in the midst of well-documented abuses.

Active accountability: Setting a Good Example

There is cause for optimism where strong and independent police oversight bodies are in place. The Commonwealth is home to many examples of best practice in this regard. Created as integral parts of systemic police reform efforts, oversight agencies such as the Independent Police Complaints Commission of England and Wales, the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland, and the Independent Complaints Directorate of South Africa have all developed a reputation for truly independent investigation of public complaints. So much so that police leaders themselves speak in praise of the benefit of having such agencies. In South Africa for instance, the police have referred cases for investigation to the Independent Complaints Directorate.¹³ Human rights commissions also exert accountability, with wider mandates than police-specific oversight bodies, although many in the Commonwealth are constrained by limited resources, politicised appointments, and hostile environments.

In fact, numerous Commonwealth police oversight bodies are making efforts to extend their powers to include counter-terrorism policing. Perhaps due to its successful track record, the office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland has being called on to investigate deaths related to police action during the three decade conflict.¹⁴ Most significantly, the call to re-examine these cases has come from the Chief Constable, head of police in Northern Ireland. This is a strong signal of the importance to go back in time and hold the perpetrators to account for past as well as contemporary abuses. Reports speak of the field officers of the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission who, in spite of grave constraints, do their utmost to provide some protection to victims of human rights violations by "proactively investigating cases and making use of all the investigation and protection powers conferred on them by the Human Rights Commission statute."¹⁵ In Australia, the mandate of the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission has included special oversight of counter-terrorism units within the New South Wales Police. For half a century, the Special Branch of the New South Wales Police was tasked with providing intelligence on terrorist activity. After a 1995 Royal Commission of Inquiry probed allegations of endemic corruption in the New South Wales Police, the Special Branch was disbanded in 1997. In turn, the Commissioner of Police, the New South Wales (NSW) government, and the Royal Commission each underlined the need for special oversight of the Protective Security Group that replaced the Special Branch. In response, NSW Police were required by law to conduct annual audits of the operations, policies and procedures of the Protective Security Group. Additionally, the Police Integrity Commission was mandated to conduct external reviews of police annual audits.¹⁶ In March 2003, the Protective Security Group's functions were absorbed into the newly created Counter Terrorist Coordination Command, but the legislative provisions were not amended to ensure the same scrutiny of the Command.¹⁷ A parliamentary inquiry commenced in February 2004 to address this glaring gap in legislation. In 2006, the Police Integrity Commission conducted a risk management assessment to examine the special oversight or monitoring arrangements needed to handle "the misconduct risks that result from the nature of the work undertaken by officers in the Counter Terrorist Coordination Command."¹⁸

Scrutiny of police counter-terrorism activities can polarise frontline police and their regulators. In 2001, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland was criticised for her report into the Police Service of Northern Ireland's investigation of the Omagh bombing, "the single worst terrorist incident since the start of 'The Troubles' in 1969."²² The Ombudsman reported major failings of investigations by the Constabulary, and criticised the Chief Constable and Assistant Chief Constable for "defective leadership, poor judgment and a lack of urgency."²³ The Police Service rejected these findings and the Chief Constable considered taking legal action to have the Ombudsman's report repealed.²⁴ Moving forward to 2007, another investigation report of the Ombudsman found evidence of police collusion with paramilitary informants near the end of "the Troubles." This time, perhaps as a result of years of credibility accumulated by the Ombudsman, the Police Service has accepted all of the recommendations. This is an indication that even in the context of terrorism, once police oversight bodies demonstrate they can use their powers effectively and will not be intimidated, their recommendations will be readily taken on board.

The Challenges of Making Oversight Effective

Whether specific to the police or with wider mandates, oversight bodies must be adequately empowered not just to highlight human rights abuses, but also to investigate abuses and assist in the prosecution of those responsible. Nigeria's Police Service Commission provides a good example of oversight powers. The Commission can investigate complaints against police officers, enforce any disciplinary measures it deems appropriate, and refer cases for criminal prosecution.

Notably, it also has the power to frame and implement policy for the police. This could include guidelines to carry out counter-terrorism policing while respecting human rights. Unfortunately, in many Commonwealth countries oversight bodies are kept weak and unable to exercise their functions to full potential. Nigeria's Police Service Commission is a case in point where due to "the lack of resources, the delegation of some of its powers to the police, the absence of an adequate legal framework, and the interference of politicians" the Commission has not been able to flourish.²⁵ In another example, the human rights unit of Papua New Guinea's Ombudsman Commission had only one staff member in 2006.²⁶ This is clearly insufficient given the absence of a national human rights commission in the country. In fact, such severe under-resourcing can make oversight powers redundant. For instance, the Police Complaints Authority in New Zealand and the National Police Commission in Sri Lanka delegate all cases of complaints investigation back to the police. While both bodies have extensive investigative powers they lack the capacity to put them into practice.

Serious legal lacunae present another hindrance to effective oversight. Malaysia's Human Rights Commission Act 1999 is often cited for shortfalls that prevent it from conforming to the Paris Principles, which lay down the minimum standards for the establishment of effective national human rights institutions. In India, shortcomings both in law and practice translate directly into lessened accountability over counter-terrorism policing. The Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 does not allow state human rights commissions to investigate human rights violations by members of the armed forces.²⁷ India's National Human Rights Commission has a slightly wider ambit in this regard - it can seek a report from the central government into the alleged abuses by armed forces personnel, but it cannot inquire on its own before making its recommendations.²⁸ Shadowy joint counter-terrorism police and military operations often fall off the radar precisely because independent accountability mechanisms cannot exercise their powers over them, and weak criminal justice systems make it practically impossible for individuals to file complaints against police officers suspected of abuse.

Following the strong precedent set by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, with the proper powers and resources, oversight bodies can unearth abuses under counter-terrorism policing, gather concrete evidence, and pinpoint accountability. In addition, oversight bodies can also review legislation to check for compliance with human rights standards, monitor police investigations of public complaints, visit places of detention, and in some jurisdictions, identify and review systemic problems within police organisations. It is immensely important that oversight bodies exercise their powers to the fullest extent, particularly with a view to exposing abuses and calling for prosecution of implicated officials. Examples from around the Commonwealth reveal that oversight bodies are better at highlighting abuses or ordering compensation, but less assertive in propelling prosecutions - a gap that must be bridged urgently.

The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia has been at the forefront in calling for repeal or reform of the Internal Security Act (ISA) to better protect human rights, and has also exercised its powers to monitor the treatment and detention conditions of ISA detainees. Yet in March 2006, Amnesty International expressed serious concern that reports of torture or ill treatment of ISA detainees by police had not been effectively investigated.²⁹ The Uganda Human Rights Commission, which has significant judicial powers, has pointed out that torture continues to be a widespread practice within security organisations. In 2003 the Commission cited the police and the army as the principal perpetrators of torture, and reiterated this in 2005.³⁰

In India, the National Human Rights Commission awarded monetary compensation in October 2006 in a case originating from the years of terrorism in the state of Punjab, involving enforced mass disappearances of suspected militants. The Commission awarded the compensation based on a report by India's Central Bureau of Investigation that found the Punjab Police had illegally cremated 2097 bodies at three sites in the Amritsar district alone. Yet, the Commission stopped short of investigating individual cases or recommending the prosecution of officers. It refused to "go into the systemic patterns of violations and declined to investigate the issues of rights to life and liberty."³¹ This case demonstrates that even independent oversight is sometimes not enough to hold police to account in the absence of a steadfast commitment to human rights of oversight bodies themselves.

Accountability from Other Quarters

A sign of strong accountability is when checks and balances come from multiple sources. Courts can play an important role in reviewing and overturning policies that impede civil liberties. In 2006, the United Kingdom Court of Appeal assessed whether the effect of six control orders violated the right to liberty and security contained in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.³⁴ The Court found that the control orders implemented unnecessary restrictions amounting to a deprivation of liberty and it quashed the orders. While this was a significant check on executive authority, the political will required to see this reform through was missing. In practice, the only change was to reduce the maximum period of time a person's movement could be restricted from 18 hours to 14 hours. This failed to address the underlying concern of the Court that control orders could result in the illegitimate deprivation of liberty.

True accountability requires a judiciary that is independent and pro-active. In Kenya, the Court of Appeal has the capacity to monitor the application of the law and identify bad practice. Additionally Kenya’s Police Manual requires that if a judge criticises the conduct or evidence of a police officer, they must immediately submit a report to their superior. Unfortunately there are long-standing concerns about the lack of independence of Kenya’s judiciary, particularly in the lower courts, compounded by a history of susceptibility to corruption and bribery.³⁵ Moreover there is no evidence that such judicial oversight takes place. This is particularly concerning given Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Unit’s targeting of minorities.

In the UK, legislative scrutiny bears directly on the implementation of anti-terrorism law through the establishment of an independent reviewer. The independent reviewer is a member of the House of Lords but not from either of the two major political parties in Parliament. His brief is to ensure terrorism laws “strike a delicate balance between providing effective tools to investigate while ensuring our civil liberties are not unnecessarily infringed.”³⁶ He overviews the making and operation of every control order put into force and presents his report to the Home Secretary. Importantly, he also reports to the public.³⁷ He is assured access to the same material as the Home Secretary, including confidential police reports, intelligence files and evidence. This privileged access lends weight to his assessments in Parliament.³⁸ The role of an independent reviewer ensures the necessity and justification for anti-terrorism measures can be strongly informed by international human rights obligations, irrespective of political agenda.

Members of Parliament (MPs) – or of State Legislatures or Local Councils – have many routine opportunities for police oversight through question time, annual departmental reviews, and examination of public interest issues in the parliamentary committee system. Attempts by governments to impose draconian anti-terrorism laws were blocked by the well-informed objections and concerns of MPs in Australia and the United Kingdom, demonstrating how legislatures can defend key democratic liberties even when pitted against “national security” concerns. Legislatures are the final forum for substantive debate on new anti-terrorism or security legislation, and the onus is on them to bear this responsibility through serious consideration.

In some cases working under severe threat, civil society organisations and individual activists across the Commonwealth are active in policy level debates and intervention, as well as unearthing and documenting human rights abuses on the ground by security forces. Liberty, a prominent London-based civil liberties group, is consistently active in publishing policy papers in response to new Home Office policies on terrorism, and submitting evidence before parliamentary committees. Liberty is a strong civil society voice that continues to challenge government moves to increase pre-charge detention periods, particularly by arguing for stronger investigative powers for the police.³⁹ In Canada, civil society groups were integral in calling for a public inquiry into Maher Arar’s case and also acted as interveners in the inquiry itself. Answering the inquiry commission’s call for submissions on policy review in December 2004, the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (a coalition of Canadian NGOs) provided a comprehensive submission on the need for an external accountability body to review the national security activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Legal activism by civil society groups can lead to intervention of the courts to curb excesses by security forces. In June 2007, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (a Colombo-based non-governmental organisation) submitted a fundamental rights application to the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, in response to the mass eviction of Tamils from Colombo on 7 June 2007. Citing security concerns, police and army officers had forcibly removed hundreds of Tamils from guesthouses in the capital. They were taken away in buses to the war affected provinces in the north and east of the country. After the application was filed, the Supreme Court issued an order putting a halt to the evictions and preventing any more.⁴⁰ The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka publicly apologised and took full responsibility for the mass removals on behalf of the government.⁴¹

The occasional investigations and reports of commissions of inquiry (often judicial commissions in the Commonwealth context) can be path breaking. In New South Wales (Australia) the 1997 Wood Royal Commission led to greater oversight requirements specific to counter-terrorism policing units being written into law. More recently, in Canada, the release of the findings of a Commission of Inquiry has underscored the urgent need for external review of the intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other security agencies. The public inquiry was created to examine the case of Maher Arar. Bowing to public outcry following Arar’s return to Canada in October 2003, the Canadian government announced the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar. The Commission released its findings in two reports in 2006. The Commissioner found that the Mounted Police’s sharing of false and misleading information that suggested Arar was linked to al-Qaida was “very likely” a factor in leading to the decision by American authorities to deport him. When the Commission publicly cleared Maher Arar of all terrorism allegations and criticised the Mounted Police’s failings in the case, its Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli resigned, after admitting he misled Parliament in Arar’s case. He also publicly apologised and said his force had made major mistakes.⁴² Arar’s lawyers are seeking disciplinary action against other Mounted Police’s officers involved in the case.

Independent investigations are necessary to disclose the true scale of disappearances and extrajudicial killings done at the hands of security personnel. Getting to the heart of specific cases leads to individual prosecution and can bring about systemic change. It is also fundamentally counter-productive to leave long-term conflicts unresolved. While she was heavily criticised by the Royal Ulster Constabulary leadership for her findings, the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland’s investigation into the Omagh bombing brought significant changes to Northern Ireland police’s investigative structures and processes. This included a full review of the role and function of the Special Branch, as well as a renewed investigation into the bombing itself.⁴³ That is the power of credible, evidence-based, detailed oversight.

The Canadian Commissioner, Dennis O’Connor, concluded in the Maher Arar case that “increased information sharing, increased police powers of coercion and increased integration among Canadian and foreign national security actors” necessitates a new review agency to oversee the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s national security activities, as well as a new review process for five other federal departments and agencies involved in national security.⁴⁴ The Commissioner recommends the establishment of the Independent Complaints and National Security Review Agency for the Mounted Police, with the jurisdiction to review all of its activities including those related to national security. In terms of the Mounted Police’s national security activities, the Commissioner recommends that the Agency be given the authority to conduct self-initiated reviews of its “compliance with laws, policies, international obligations and for standards of propriety expected in Canadian society.”⁴⁵ In fact, Commissioner O’Connor is simply applying the principle of external independent oversight to counter-terrorism policing.

What Accountability is Needed?

There are clear steps that must be taken to ensure accountability in counter-terrorism policing. These include defining the role of police, particularly in relation to other agents such as military or paramilitary forces. The role of police must be regularly evaluated and activities audited to monitor and hold to account any examples of wrongdoing. Police must strictly adhere to internal reporting and investigation procedures in counter-terrorism and all other areas of policing. Additionally and where possible, special oversight mechanisms should be considered in anti-terrorism legislation that grants specific powers to police. Finally, and as always, no measure is successful if it exists on paper only. Police accountability requires resources, and practical and political support to ensure it provides efficient and effective oversight.

The Commonwealth faces a great challenge to promote truly independent and vigilant police oversight in the face of mechanisms that are weak, lack independence, have been poorly implemented or are non-existent. Commonwealth members must use the best practices available in their accountability measures, and extend them to specific areas including counter-terrorism policing. Additionally, the Commonwealth should support initiatives like the International Network for the Independent Oversight of Policing in the development and implementation of internationally agreed standards on police oversight. Only through active leadership can the Commonwealth ensure that bad practice and poor accountability do not prevail.

1. (2007) 'Missing of Kashmir', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 11, 17 March: http://www.epw.org.in/epw/uploads/articles/10361.pdf as on 15 June 2007.
3. Human Rights Watch (2006) Improving Civilian Protection in Sri Lanka: Recommendations for the Government and the LTTE, p. 51, September 1: http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/srilanka0906/ as on 2 April 2007.
4. Human Rights Watch (2006) Improving Civilian Protection in Sri Lanka: Recommendations for the Government and the LTTE, p. 51, 1 September: http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/srilanka0906/ as on 2 April 2007.
5. Human Rights Watch (2006) Improving Civilian Protection in Sri Lanka: Recommendations for the Government and the LTTE, p. 51, 1 September: http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/srilanka0906/ as on 2 April 2007.
6. (2006) 'The Conflict'', Uganda Conflict Action Network, http://www.ugandacan.org/history.php as on 26 June 2007
7. Uganda Human Rights Commission (2005) Uganda Human Rights Commission 8th Annual Report, p. 120
8. Bowcott, O (2007) '15 murders linked to police collusion with loyalists', The Guardian, 23 January: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Northern_Ireland/Story/0,,1996450,00.html as on 2 April 2007
9. Public Security Ordinance, 1947 (Sri Lanka)
10. Section 49 (amended in 2004), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, (1967) India; Section 6, Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, (1992) India, Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, (1973) India
11. Section 80, Internal Security Act, (1984) Lesotho
12. Section 32, Third Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, (2002) Uganda
13. Rauch, J, Van der Spuy, E (2006) 'Police Reform in post-conflict Africa: A Review', Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), October:
http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=output_details.asp%3FRID%3D1143%26OTID%3D2%26TID%3D17 as on 15 June 2007.
14. O'Loan, N (2006) Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland for the Canadian Association for the Oversight of Law Enforcement: 2 October: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/vancouver_2_10_06.pdf as on 2 April 2007
15. Human Rights Watch (2006) Improving Civilian Protection in Sri Lanka: Recommendations for the Government and the LTTE, p. 53-54, 1 September: http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/srilanka0906/ as on 2 April 2007
16. Following from Section 14(e), Police Integrity Commission Act, 1996 (Australia)
17. Section 14(e) of the Police Integrity Commission Act, 1996 (Australia) now stands repealed.
18. Police Integrity Commission (2006) Management of Misconduct Risks by the New South Wales Police Counter Terrorist Coordination Command: An Assessment, p. v, September: http://www.pic.nsw.gov.au/PDF_files/CTCC.pdf as on 2 April 2007
19. Wadham, J (2005) 'Full text: IPCC statement', The Guardian, 18 August: http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,16132,1551931 as on 2 April 2006
20. Email correspondence between CHRI staff and Nick Hardwick, President, Independent Police Complaints Commission, dated 12 July 2007.
21. Independent Police Complaints Commission (2007), Jean Charles de Menezes: IPCC Makes Decision on Shooting Discipline, 11 May: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/pr110507_stockwell.htm as on 17 May 2007
22. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (2001) 'Statement by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland on her Investigation of Matters Relating to the Omagh Bombing on August 15 1998',
23. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, p. 1, 12 December: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/ombudsman/po121201omagh1.pdf as on 15 June 2007 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (2001) 'Statement by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland on her Investigation of Matters Relating to the Omagh Bombing on August 15 1998', Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, p. 12, 12 December: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/ombudsman/po121201omagh1.pdf as on 15 June 2007
24. (2001) 'Omagh bomb report 'grossly unfair'', BBC News, 12 December: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1707299.stm as on 13 April 2007
25. Rauch, J, Van der Spuy, E (2006) 'Police Reform in post-conflict Africa: A Review', Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), p. 115, October: http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=output_details.asp%3FRID%3D1143%26OTID%3D2%26TID%3D17 as on 15 June 2007
26. Human Rights Watch (2007) Papua New Guinea: Human Rights Watch World Report 2007: http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/45aca2a425.html as on 21 April 2007
27. Section 21(5), Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (India)
28. Section 19, Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (India)
29. Amnesty International (2006) Malaysia: Amnesty International's campaign to stop torture and ill-treatment in the 'war on terror', p. 3, March: http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA280032006ENGLISH/$File/ASA2800306.pdf as on 21 April 2007
30. Uganda Human Rights Commission (2005) Uganda Human Rights Commission 8th Annual Report, p. 114
31. Kumar, N R (2006) 'Justice Bhalla's mandate is limited', The Tribune, 31 December: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20061231/edit.htm#1 as on 3 June 2007
32. Pinto-J K (2007) 'Regretting What Might Have Been: A Critique of the National Police Commission of Sri Lanka', Roundtable on Police Reform: An Exchange of Experiences from South Asia, p. 1, 23-24 March: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/exchange/CHRI%20PAPER%20-%20MARCH%202007.doc as on 15 June 2007
33. Pinto-J K (2007) 'Regretting What Might Have Been: A Critique of the National Police Commission of Sri Lanka', Roundtable on Police Reform: An Exchange of Experiences from South Asia, p. 8, 23-24 March: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/exchange/CHRI%20PAPER%20-%20MARCH%202007.doc as on 15 June 2007
34. The case in point is Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ (2006) EWCA Civ 1141: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1141.html as 2 August 2007
35. 'It will be some time before the judiciary is in a position to act as an effective accountability mechanism', Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Kenya Human Rights Commission (2006) The Police, The People, The Politics: Police Accountability in Kenya, pp51-52: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/kenya_country_report_2006.pdf as on 26 June 2007, See also International Commission of Jurists (2005) Kenya: Judicial Independence, Corruption and Reform, April: http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/kenyareport.pdf as on 15 June 2007
36. Lord Carlile of Berriew QC (2007) Second Report of the Independent reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005: http://www.security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/independent-reviews/lord-carlile-ann-report.pdf as on 16 April 2007
37. Lord Carlile of Berriew QC (2006) Special Report of the Independent Reviewer in Relation to Quarterly Reports to Parliament Under Section 14(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, 11 December: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/independent-reviews/pta-review2-06.pdf?view=Binary as on 15 June 2007
38. Travis, A, Norton T, R (2006) 'Anti-terror watchdog has reputation for fairness', The Guardian, 15 February: http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,5399860-103685,00.html as on 9 July 2007
39. Liberty (2007) Extending pre-charge detention for terror suspects will make us less safe, Press Release, 1 February: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news-and-events/1-press-releases/2007/pre-charge-detention.shtml as on 9 July 2007
40. Centre for Policy Alternatives (2007) The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) welcomes the interim order issued by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, Press Release, 9 June: http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/Press_Release_on_the_interim_order.pdf as on 9 July 2007
41. Balachandran, PK (2007) 'Lankan PM apologises for expulsion of Tamils', The Hindustan Times, 10 June:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=534ff3a9-f452-4a0e-b9ad-433de3bf1fa0
&MatchID1=4488&TeamID1=8&TeamID2=10&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1120&PrimaryID=4488&
Headline=Lanka+PM+apologises+for+Tamils'+expulsion as on 9 July 2007
42. (2006) 'Canada police commissioner quits', BBC News, 7 December: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6216064.stm as on 2 April 2007
43. O'Loan, N (2006) Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland for the Canadian Association for the Oversight of Law Enforcement, p. 7, 2 October: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/vancouver_2_10_06.pdf as on 2 April 2007
44. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (2006) Arar Commission recommends a new review agency for the RCMP's national security activities, and a new review process for 5 other agencies, Press Release, 12 December: http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/PolicyReviewDec12-English.pdf as on 4 April 2007
45. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (2006) Arar Commission recommends a new review agency for the RCMP's national security activities, and a new review process for 5 other agencies, Press Release, 12 December: http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/PolicyReviewDec12-English.pdf as on 4 April 2007